So, It Looks like I Was Wrong
Iran has signalled that it desires de-escalation: It has said as much to the UN. With an ongoing war in Gaza, Israel will probably welcome the chance to defer the “day of judgement” with Iran and focus on the task at hand. The US also seems to be urging Israel in this direction—as are Israel’s neighbors. If Israel does counterattack, it will probably be in a way that grants them deniability so that Iran does not feel the need to escalate further. Iran appears to have engaged in this attack mostly in order to save face. A cyberattack, or absent that a kinetic strike, against the Shahed drone building facilities is the most likely form of retaliation: Or some other portion of their missile production capability, with an attack on nuclear research facilities being the second most likely. (Of course, an attack on the Shahed drone building facilities will have the added benefit of aiding Ukraine—and the additional cost of bothering the Russians. That said, the use of the drones against Israel has opened this door, and it would curry favor with the West.)
As impressive as Israel’s defense was, one should notice that Iran shot far fewer cruise missiles than drones and ballistic missiles; Iran may have fired off its older ordinance in order to give away less about its capabilities. Thus, while we can probably revise ours, and Israel’s, ability to defend against Iran’s missile capabilities up after this recent display, we should not be too overconfident when facing Iran in another context.
While I still think conflict with Iran is likely in the long run, the US does not appear to be too eager for it now—because of concerns regarding Russia and China. The US simply doesn’t feel that it has the resources to contain China and Russia while becoming entangled in a Middle Eastern conflict. This partly explains why Biden suggested that Israel try to paint the successful defense itself as a form of victory. The White House has had one persistent interest throughout this conflict, beyond any loyalty to Israel, which is avoiding escalation.
The war in Ukraine made me revise my belief in the “assume perfect strategy” mode of analysis: Putin should have used his position to take the Donbas and call it a day—indeed, the US practically gave him a green light when Biden made his “minor incursion” remark. I figured Iran, motivated by an irrational religious ideology, may similarly act against its interests. It seems they may be smarter than I gave them credit for.
The ball is in Netanyahu’s court—and, if he is as clever as I think he is, he will retaliate quietly.