The Hidden Deterrent: Why Taiwan Probably Has Nuclear Weapons

(And the Non-Proliferation Treaty Legally Allows This)

If you were Taiwan, would you do everything you could to develop nuclear weapons? Would you sit there defenceless with a billion lunatic communists threatening to invade? Why then do most of us believe, so uncritically, that Taiwan doesn’t have nuclear weapons? We believe it because that is what we have been told: A little bit of critical thinking, however, shows us that assessment is probably wrong.

Taiwan has a well-developed nuclear energy infrastructure. It has one of the best educated workforces in the world and possesses a high-tech manufacturing sector. The only thing that could stop Taiwan from becoming a nuclear state is the Taiwanese people. Given the threat of Chinese aggression, does that seem likely to you?

I too used to buy the common wisdom: Taiwan’s nuclear program was shut down at US insistence in the late 1980’s. However, few people are aware of just how much progress that program made and how easily its final stages could be completed with the help of nuclear scientists fleeing the former Soviet Union.

The only reason the CIA became aware of Taiwan’s nuclear program in the 80’s it that a scientist by the name of Chang Seng-i told the agency about it. It was only with his help that the CIA was able to discern the program’s hidden research sites. China’s recent aggression is likely to make such whistle-blowers rarer than they were.

As for obtaining fissionable material, Taiwan has been capable of producing sufficient quantities of that since the 70’s. Bruce Billings in a 1971 report declared that once the Canadian-supplied Taiwan Research Reactor went critical, “the GRC could, by dumping the core of the reactor, have adequate fissionable material for a nuclear weapon.” A telegram from March 1977 identifying IAEA inspectors Herbert Frittum and supervisor Leslie Thorne claims they detected a secret port at the Taiwan Research Reactor that could be used to remove spent fuel from the reactor fuel cooling pond so that it could be reprocessed into plutonium. Furthermore, Taiwan has monazite deposits containing thorium which could also be used as the basis for a nuclear weapon by transmuting that thorium into Uranium-233 without utilizing the centrifuges and other apparatuses that give away most nuclear programs. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 221

The Taiwan easily overcame the first major hurdle in developing a nuclear weapon, obtaining weapons grade uranium. The program had only one major problem remaining: The problem of miniaturization. With many former Soviet nuclear scientists seeking employment in the 90’s, Taiwan could have easily purchased the expertise needed to solve this problem. In fact, they could have purchased the weapons grade uranium and plutonium as well as fully functioning weapons.

If you look at Taiwan’s defense expenditures, some seem quite curious unless Taiwan possesses a nuclear arsenal of some sort.

We can see that previously Taiwan focused on short range missiles that could attack bridgeheads, staging areas, and ships as they cross the strait. But as time has passed, we see Taiwan switching towards long range cruise missiles—cruise missiles that would do little more than annoy the PRC unless they carry a nuclear warhead. The Hsiung Feng II carries a 400 lbs warhead; for the sake of comparison, a Tomahawk cruise missile carries a 1000 lbs warhead (a missile which is, in principle, nuclear capable and was in the not-too-distant past). What exactly does Taiwan plan to achieve lobbing 400 lbs cruise missiles at Beijing. Certainly, Taiwan can make some trouble with these, but attacks on Beijing using conventional warheads are unlikely to do anything beyond stiffening China’s resolve (which is absolutely within the Yun Feng’s operational range). That said, a four-hundred-pound nuclear warhead could represent an insurmountable deterrent. It makes sense to invest the resources into producing such a missile only if you have a nuclear warhead to arm it with. Otherwise, Taiwan would be much better off increasing its arsenal Hsiung Feng IIE missiles (using the extended range variant with a range of 2,000km—i.e. 1,200 miles—which is one hundred miles farther than the distance from Taipei to Beijing). Furthermore, these missile programs received more funding than one might otherwise expect—funding that could have easily hidden the expenses associated with a nuclear program.

There is evidence that Taiwan renewed its nuclear weapons development in the early 2000’s, interestingly around the time that it became interested in long range missile technology. In 2004, the United Daily News reported that Taiwan had built a secret underground laboratory in the southern city of Kaohsiung that was capable of producing nuclear weapons. In 2007, Taiwan was caught attempting to purchase centrifuges from a German company, which could be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. While I have commented on how Taiwan has other methods of procuring fissile material, one has to wonder what exactly Taiwan planned to do with these centrifuges.

If you were Taiwan, knowing full well how much damage the US takes in military simulations involving the defence of Taiwan, wouldn’t you want your own nuclear weapons? Would you trust your survival to the vagaries of American democracy—given that the US had nullified a mutual defence treaty with you and that it does not recognize you diplomatically? While Taiwan would welcome US assistance in the event it is invaded, it cannot rely upon it. A clandestine nuclear program is its only means to guarantee its independence. The US, on the other hand, likely welcomes a Taiwan that can defend itself—and is far less likely to complain about a secret nuclear weapons program than it was when it needed China as a counterbalance to Russia.

There are those who would argue that a nuclear deterrence is useful only if others know about it. This is true, but Taiwan can always choose the right time to make this announcement. Unlike other nuclear states, Taiwan has to fear that its nuclear power status could provoke an invasion. Taiwan has a history of pursuing strategic ambiguity in its foreign policy and would prefer to keep its nuclear capabilities ambiguous in order to deter China without provoking a strong response.

Objections and Rebuttals:

Of course, some will object to this line of reasoning. “If Taiwan had nuclear weapons, wouldn’t we know by now?” But covert nuclear programs are not designed to be obvious. Israel’s arsenal was inferred from doctrine and delivery systems long before whistleblowers like Vanunu confirmed it. South Africa had six warheads before anyone in the public knew. Secrecy is not evidence of absence. It is the objective.

Others will argue that China would have already invaded if Taiwan had nukes. That logic is precisely backward. The mere possibility that Taiwan could launch a retaliatory strike—even a single low-yield tactical nuke on Beijing—raises the cost of invasion astronomically. Uncertainty is a deterrent. Strategic ambiguity is a shield.

Another objection rests on the belief that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would have detected any weapons program. This assumes a degree of omniscience the agency does not possess. Iran deceived the IAEA for years. So did Iraq. Syria developed a reactor under its nose. Taiwan has both the technological means and historical precedent for circumventing oversight. In fact, it has already done so. A 1977 cable documents a secret port at Taiwan’s research reactor to extract spent fuel—something done while IAEA inspectors were present.

Still others will claim the United States would never tolerate such a program. But that objection ignores the changing geopolitical landscape. The U.S. pressured Taiwan to shut down its program in the 1980s to appease China, which was a vital partner against the Soviet Union. That incentive no longer exists. Today, the U.S. may prefer a Taiwan that can deter China without requiring direct American intervention. Strategic ambiguity on both sides—Taiwan’s nukes and Washington’s official ignorance—serves everyone’s interest.

And finally, some will suggest that a nuclear program would provoke the very war it aims to deter. That may be true if Taiwan announced its arsenal. But it hasn’t. Ambiguity, again, is the answer. A program that stays undeclared does not cross red lines—until it must. That is exactly how Israel’s deterrent functions, and how Taiwan’s almost certainly does as well.

Conclusion:

Taiwan most likely has nuclear weapons. That simple fact explains what would otherwise be a puzzling underinvestment in conventional defense. It may also reflect a deeper strategic calculus: by keeping its conventional forces relatively modest, Taiwan increases the likelihood of American intervention, thereby raising the stakes for China. But the most credible explanation is this—Taiwan doesn’t need to match China’s military power symmetrically because it possesses a quiet, asymmetric deterrent of its own.

[As for why the NPT allows them to have nuclear weapons, well, Taiwan was the officially recognized government of China until 1971. Since the PRC detonated a nuclear weapon in 1964, it technically belongs to the group of nuclear powers as defined by the NPT. In essence, Taiwan was grandfathered by the PRC’s decision to develop a weapon. This may seem casuistical, but it holds up far better than Alvin Bragg’s thinking regarding the Stormy Daniels payment.]