Ukraine's Coming Counterattack and Other Thoughts on the Ukrainian War
I plan to post a weekly summary of reporting I have consumed on the Ukrainian war, along with general thoughts and observations. This is the first such post.
One notable development is the response from Russian milbloggers to reportedly leaked, and in some cases altered, classified US military documents about the war in Ukraine. These documents reportedly depict operational reports and assessments of the capabilities of the Ukrainian military. The documents appear valid though the appearance of otherwise identical documents making conflicting claims about things like casualty counts suggests doctoring. The response from Russian milbloggers highlights the continued fear of potential Ukrainian counteroffensives in the Russian information space.
There are reports that Russian aviation units are changing tactics, possibly due to aviation losses and depleted stocks of high-precision weapons. Russian aviation units are reducing their operations in the vicinity of Ukrainian positions and relying more on remote aviation strikes with guided aerial bombs. This limits the ability to conduct true close air support, but also makes it difficult for Ukrainian forces to drive Russian aviation units away from Ukraine's borders. It is unclear what countermeasures Ukraine should employ to counter this tactic.
There have also been limited ground attacks along various frontlines, including the Svatove-Kreminna line and the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline. Russian forces have continued to advance in and around Bakhmut, although at a slow pace.
Meanwhile, measures to support Russia's ongoing spring conscription cycle continue amid crypto-mobilization efforts. I imagine that Russia will be forced to conscript more broadly and more generally at some point in the next year. That said, it is only likely to change the war’s outcome if Russia takes its time, trains these men properly, and manages to procure meaningful military equipment, either from China or through domestic production. Putin is likely worried about the political repercussions of fully mobilizing and adopting a war economy.
High-ranking Russian officials can only leave Russia with permission from Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. One has to wonder why the Kremlin is putting this restriction in place. Additionally, former Russian officer and prominent critical milblogger Igor Girkin revealed that a volunteer battalion he previously promoted is essentially a sham.
Overall, these developments highlight the complex and ongoing nature of the conflict in Ukraine. Despite efforts to negotiate a resolution, tensions between Russia and Ukraine remain high, and both sides continue to take actions that could escalate the conflict. What further developments will arise in the coming weeks and months remains to be seen.
The common wisdom is that Ukraine’s counterattack will involve a thrust Melitopol. However, given Melitopol’s strategic role in maintaining Russia’s land bridge to Crimea, Russia is likely to have devoted significant manpower and fortifications to preventing that thrust. I strongly suspect that Ukraine will attempt to adopt one of three strategies, which I will list in descending order of probability:
A direct attack on Crimea originating from Kherson
A counterattack around Bakhmut
A thrust toward Mariupol
And last, the thrust toward Melitopol
At the very least, there will be some sort of shaping operation that procedes the thrust towards Melitopol.