Ukraine War Update
I plan to start writing articles that provide commentary on the ISW’s Ukraine war summary along with some bullet points of my own at the end.
Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukrainian forces are prepared to start counteroffensive operations.
One has to wonder what purpose this signaling serves. After all, it makes little sense to warn your opponent that you are about to attack. This makes the most sense if Ukraine is actually planning further delays and is looking to cause tension among Russian forces or force a pause in their offensive operations. I expect a delay of another month while shaping operations continue. Chances are they are waiting on the arrival of some additional key equipment, quite possibly other forms of long range missiles and drones. (These drones may be domestically produced).
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin escalated his feud with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), likely hoping to draw criticism back to the Russian military leadership and downplay his ongoing conflict with Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov. Prigozhin’s flamboyant allegations are also likely an attempt to retain his heightened initiative within the Russian information space following the capture of Bakhmut.
What is interesting about this conflict between Kadryov and Prigozhin is that this is the rare case of a fight that Prigozhin did not start and did not want: The remarks that triggered it were very minor indeed—they amounted to saying that Kadyrov has not been given exclusive control of any part of the front the way Wagner was. This statement from Prigozhin is undoubtedly true: Kadryov’s forces have mostly been used as a kind of “softening force” or a “berserker” force designed to frighten: If you recall, they were tasked with killing Zelensky early in the war. This suggests that there are political forces arraying against Prigozhin and that Kadyrov is seizing upon the opportunity to align himself with them.
Prigozhin seized on general Russian discontent with security on the Belgorod Oblast border to threaten that Wagner Group forces may operate in Russian territory without approval from the Russian military command.
Some Wagner forces will likely be deployed to the Belgorod oblast and used to counter the incursions there. That said, Russia might be worried that Wagner’s reputation for brutality might spill over into the civilian population. Russian witnesses to Wagner atrocities could be politically destabilizing (but then again they could prove useful if Wagner needs to be discredited at some point). PMC Patriot might also be deployed, but this creates its own problems, namely that Putin does not want to enrich Shoigu, its owner. The Belgorod operation is not esp. well-supplied. This suggests it is more of a shaping operation. This is again one reason to use PMC’s to counter it. Don’t significantly alter your order of battle to deal with a distraction.
A Russian Duma Deputy stated during a public forum on June 1 that Russia has failed to accomplish any of its articulated goals for the “special military operation” in Ukraine.
This is interesting but also untrue. They have turned the water back on in Crimea and secured a land bridge to Crimea. What is true is that they have not achieved their specifically political goals. Still, it is interesting to see Putin’s hold on the Duma weaken—or to see Putin using them to scapegoat his generals.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and northwest and south of Kreminna.
Regular Russian forces have likely largely relieved Wagner Group forces in Bakhmut amid a low offensive tempo in the area as of June 3.
As I said above, I expect Wagner to be turned against the Free Russian Legion. Their brutality will be used to scare partisans into hiding.
Russian forces focused offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line near Marinka.
Avdiivka places Ukraine within HIMARS range of their main land route to Crimea. So, this Russian offensive actually serves a defensive purpose.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces continued efforts to establish defensive positions in Kherson Oblast.
The Russian military leadership is attempting to create and staff new military formations.
It is interesting that they are doing this rather than simply strengthening old formations. It might be that knowing your formation was ravaged in combat leaves institutional scares that they don’t want carrying over. Another possibility is that this is a reform effort, the hope is that a complete do-over might allow Russia to correct the pathologies that placed it into this situation in the first place.
Likely Ukrainian partisans assassinated a Russian collaborator in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.