The Logic of the Counter-Offensive in Bahkmut
I mentioned in an earlier post why I thought Ukraine was so focused on defending Bahkmut. It appears that I was partially correct. However, I missed an important detail: Bahkmut is uniquely vulnerable because of the mishmash of forces operating there; these rivalries prevent Russian forces from cooperating effectively, and this is precisely why Ukraine has decided to push there.
In hindsight, it seems obvious that the counteroffensive (or at least its first stage) was going to be in Bahkmut.
Now we have a definitive answer regarding why Ukraine defended Bahkmut so adamantly, even to the point of irreplaceable elite troops: It was where they were planning to counter-attack.
Ukraine seems to be focusing on taking strategic locations around the city: Their great hope is that Wagner forces would keep pushing forward while the weaker Russian forces guarding their flanks completely collapsed. Ukraine is hoping that Russia either moves troops from the South to reenforce the attack in Bahkmut and/or to route the Wagner forces fighting them with a double envelopment as the Russian forces guarding their flanks retreat.
If last year’s offensive is any clue, it is likely that this offensive is a prelude to a later offensive in the south—just as the offensive around Kharkiv was to the offensive around Kherson.
Russia has already deployed a large number of reserves, including their best airborne forces. This will help prepare a second, main offensive thrust using the forces Ukrainian is holding back, a force eleven times the size of that currently deployed in Bahkmut. (1 of the 12 brigades Ukraine has trained for the counteroffensive is currently deployed in Bahkmut).
It is hard to say where Ukraine will strike next: But I anticipate they will use two to three brigades to attack somewhere adjacent to Bahkmut in order to take advantage of the fact that Russia now lacks proper reserves. Then, once Russia is forced to scramble to hold this breakthrough, I expect a strike somewhere in the south. A likely target for the next phase of the attack is Kremina-Lyman.
At some point, Ukraine will have to threaten Crimea directly or, at least, Putin’s landbridge to it. If Ukraine pursues two diversionary attacks around, one in Bahkmut and another in an area adjacent to it, Ukraine’s main thrust might be an attack towards Mauripol, hitting Russia’s landbridge in the southeast in its attempt to break their landbridge rather than further west. This approach fits in nicely with their diversionary attacks around Bahkmut and avoids an opposed crossing of the Dniper.
Regardless, this preliminary offensive around Bahkmut was truly a masterful strategic move. I am very impressed with the quality of Ukraine’s military strategy.
Slava Ukraine.