Taiwan recently purchased about a hundred M1A1 tanks; one has to ask, what value do tanks have for Taiwan; specifically, what value do they have over and above the 500 M60 tanks they already possess? Taiwan argues that they are necessary to oppose Chinese bridgeheads, but is an M1A1 tank enough better than an M60 for this purpose that this expenditure makes sense (esp. when you consider that its turbine engine makes them “logistically separate” from the diesel M60)? And shouldn’t Taiwan be looking to stop China from developing the aerial and naval superiority necessary for an amphibious operation to begin with?
As the Germans discovered during the Normandy landings, it is very hard to use a tank force to oppose an amphibious one: The tanks could be very, very useful to you if you can get them to the landing zone in time, but your opponent is likely to choose a location that makes that unlikely. Wouldn’t helicopters be better suited to this task, as they are much faster than tanks? A properly distributed helicopter force could oppose a bridgehead as could a good A10 like plane or the right kind of drone: They are all fast enough to “make a break for it” and reach the landing zone before the bridgehead is established. The M1A1s would only be useful for this purpose if you managed to guess the landing location in advance. So why buy tanks?
Well, before I give my explanation for this behavior, I should address the likely Taiwanese counter argument: We, in fact, do know the most likely place the PLA will land; they will land near Taichung Harbor, and the tanks will be ready to meet them there. Well, if you truly know this, wouldn't howitzers and dug in gun emplacements be more useful to you? For tanks to make sense in this role, there must be some uncertainty about the landing spot—a very specific amount of uncertainty; you must be certain that you will have credible intelligence regarding the landing spot, credible intelligence that gives you enough foreknowledge to move your tanks but does not give you enough to fortify it in advance with cheaper, more permanent assets. And, even here, wouldn't mobile artillery be a better choice? Perhaps Taiwan is trusting its spy network, but double agents are a real concern and I believe that any plan that relies on being able to predict the PLA landing zone will simply push the Chinese into choosing an unpredictable one.
The real reason Taiwan bought Abrams tanks is, of course, that tanks are cool as fuck—and that it allows Taiwan to say to China that, while we may have fewer tanks, ours are better than yours. Of course, if superior Chinese airpower manages to take out those tanks, then they will no longer be superior.
No, Taiwan needs to adopt a realistic defense mentality—which means placing prestige weapons on the back burner. Here is what I think Taiwan should spend its money on (recently, Taiwan has begun spending an appropriate amount on its military, but it has been underspending for many, many years, so it probably needs to up its military spending by another half a percent, going from 2.5 percent to 3 percent of GDP, to make up for lost time).
Here are the weapons systems I think Taiwan should work to procure, listed in order from the most significant to the least.
1.SAM Systems, Land Based — The most vital thing is to deprive China of air superiority and to win time for the US relief efforts to arrive. Given the relatively few stealth systems China has in its arsenal, quality SAM systems are vital to this task.
(I highly recommend the following article: Taiwanese Military Expert: 'Not Even the Gods Can Save Taiwan' Unless Air Defenses Upgraded, militarywatchmagazine.com)
2.SAM Systems, Marine Based — The same principle as above, except that mobile sea platforms, while more expensive, might be able to hit Chinese air assets sooner.
3. Drones — Recent tests suggest that drone swarms are likely to prove an extremely useful tactic in countering a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Basically, they have to win time and stop the Chinese from gaining air superiority. If the Chinese are forced to use up their SAM systems shooting down attack and recon drones, that makes the air forces that Taiwan holds back even more effective.
More importantly, naval drones—either submersibles or low-lying surface vessels loaded with explosives, could seriously complicate the crossing of the Taiwan Strait. Thousands of such drones could essentially shut the strait down and make it uncrossable.
4.Naval Mines — Again, if the strategy is to win time, mines will slow down any Chinese operation. And the longer that operation takes, the more China must fear intervention from Taiwan’s allies. Furthermore, they should make the next item on our list more effective.
5.Anti-ship missiles — Again, the idea is to hit the amphibious forces long before they reach the shore.
6.Landmines — There are certain key landing spots in Taiwan that are so superior to others that they should simply be mined and fortified with hedgehogs preemptively, and, as these mines should basically become a permanent fixture of Taiwan’s landscape, Taiwan should not concern itself with the “ethics” of this too much.
7. Boghammers and Torpedo Boats—Again, with the idea of opposing the crossing. The USN has conducted exercises where “Boghammers” armed with anti-air guns and anti-ship missiles have stormed large naval groups. These Boghammer forces are very difficult to oppose; and would likely be even more difficult to oppose if they had proper air support from drones and traditional aircraft. Indeed, “Boghammer drones” may prove esp. useful—arming some with harpoon missiles, others with anti-aircraft missiles/guns, and placing explosives in the noses of some of them, hoping they can ram enemy ships. A combined attack of air based and speed boat based drones might present China with a real challenge, one that is very hard to anticipate because it will be so unlike the kind of fighting China has been training for.
8.Artillery—Properly distributed artillery can be “pre-ranged” to hit China at their likely landing spots, which Taiwan should have some advanced notice of—enough to point artillery at it, not enough to make sure tanks arrive on time.
9.MANPADS—As an additional way of contesting the air.
10.JAVELIN and NLAW Systems—Useful in opposing the land invasion once it has come, but notice how I am placing this near the bottom of the list. These systems will increase the cost of a Chinese invasion, but they won’t stop it cold. That said, increasing the cost is a good thing and these are relatively cheap.
9.Aircraft—Specifically fighter aircraft and close air support aircraft that can oppose the crossing and hit beachheads quickly. Again, the logic is to be able to defeat them as they are crossing the straight, first and foremost, and prevent them from forming a beachhead. However, Taiwan has a fair number of F-16s; so it should probably prioritize attack helicopters first. However, it is clear—as the Battle of Britain illustrates—that a quality airforce is vital to defending an island nation.
12. Diesel Based Attack Subs—Again, with the aim of opposing the crossing; you may sense a pattern here. Control the air, slow down the crossing of the strait, hit beachheads with as much cheap firepower as possible. That said, these are at the bottom of the list precisely because they are not cheap.
These should be bought from other countries—Taiwan does not have time to develop a new, domestic design. While there is an argument to produce them domestically, because of fear that China will interfere with maintenance and spare parts, Taiwan simply doesn’t have the time. It should buy some as soon as the above mention acquisitions are made and set about solving the problem of spare parts later. In fact, there is an argument to be made that this item belongs in spot number 9; however, massive amounts of artillery are cheaper and will force China to prolong its air campaign. The few diesel based subs Taiwan could afford might get taken out quickly, many hurdreds of howitzers will not.
Tanks, sadly, don’t even make it on the list—nor do most large naval vessels, though there could be a case for frigates. Once these vitals systems are purchased, we can discuss the prioritization among “secondary needs.”
A side point, Taiwan should also relax its gun laws and allow citizens to purchase them more easily and cheaply—why not allow your citizens to “pre-game” an insurgency?
In summary, Taiwan needs to deprioritize prestige systems and go for tried and true defensive weapons that will turn it into a powerful fortress; the prestige weapons can wait till after Fortress Taiwan has been constructed.
Some very interesting context.
https://warontherocks.com/2021/12/the-counter-intuitive-sensibility-of-taiwans-new-defense-strategy/