Nuclear Non-Proliferation guaranteed that the USSR could reconstitute itself at will, as soon the right leader decided it was the right time to reconquer the territories that broke off in 1991.
Why? Very simply, it guaranteed that Russia could invade its neighbours without ever suffering invasion itself: We see this in the current war in Ukraine. Russia can attack Ukraine but Ukraine cannot counterattack into Russian territory without risking nuclear attack—and the West dare not give the invaded too much aid because that, you see, would be escalatory.
In giving Russia a nuclear monopoly among all the former Soviet Republics, we gave Russia the power to reconstitute the USSR at will—all to mitigate the rather exaggerated risk of “nuclear proliferation.” We gave Russia a nuclear monopoly that guaranteed it would remain the local hegemon. Indeed, a hegemony similar to the one the US has over North and South America—even greater, in fact, given the fact that the Russians are more prone to aggression.
It was a mistake. The larger Soviet Republics should have been allowed to keep their nuclear weapons. We thought we were being conservative, but we were in reality increasing the probability of a nuclear war by decreasing the cost of Russian aggression against her former colonies.
Nuclear weapons are prized possessions—not even North Korea, whose people have faced famine the likes of which no former Soviet Republic would ever face, has attempted to sell its weapons on the black market. If the US can abide North Korea possessing nuclear weapons, how serious was the threat of rogue nukes after all? We exaggerated the threat while underplaying the chances of renewed Russian aggression. They are too valuable to the states that possess them, and the consequences of selling them to terrorists is far too high for even the most criminal of regimes to consider it. Indeed, Russia is more likely to sell its nukes now that is under sanctions than Ukraine ever was—and that is profoundly unlikely.
This misstep is motivated by the same sentimentality that caused us to agree to the highly unfavourable START treaty and a general naivete regarding Russia’s future leadership. An excessive fear of nuclear weapons causes our democracy to systematically favor strategies that make people “feel safer” whether or not they actually increase the probability of a nuclear exchange. Forcing Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons and hand them over to Russia is perfect example of such an exchange. Pressuring Taiwan not to develop its own nuclear arsenal is another.
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