Bill Kristol and other members of the Twitter hivemind are chiding Ron Desantis for saying that he would not participate in Trump’s extradition. I think it is absurd that those who work so hard to complicate the clear meaning of the Second Amendment pretend that there is no Constitutional nuance regarding questions of extradition. For over a hundred years, from 1860 when Kentucky v. Dennison was decided until 1987, governors had discretion over extradition requests. It is only with the ruling in Puerto Rico v Branstad that the SCOTUS’s thinking on this matter changed. The Founding Fathers intentionally gave governors the power to refuse extradition when questions over jurisdiction arise. Artivle IV, Section 2, Clause 2 very distinctly says: A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
New York has no jurisdiction regarding a campaign finance violation: A key part of Alvin Bragg’s indictment. I would argue that Desantis has no obligation to extradite when a local DA is attempting to usurp federal authority. The Constitution does not say ‘to the State issuing the indictment’ but very explicitly ‘to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.’ One can assume this wording reflects the Founders’ belief that governors are not obligated to extradite when a state is usurping Federal authority or the authority of another state.
Let a federal court force Desantis to extradite: There is always a chance this works its way to the Supreme Court and Kentucky v. Dennison becomes reinstated over Puerto Rico v Branstad once again. To avoid retaliatory prosecution, something that will inevitably follow this bizarre indictment, governors must have the same discretion over extradition they had in the past.