Is Ukraine working too hard to keep Bakhmut? Throughout the war, Ukraine has employed a common-sense heuristic to guide its defensive decisions: Whatever Putin wants most, Ukraine defends the hardest. And, indeed, this is a decent heuristic, assuming your opponent is acting rationally and strategically. What happens, though, if your opponent’s motives aren’t entirely rational? What happens if your opponents’ actions are influenced by internal dissension as much as they are by military necessity? To determine whether Ukraine is right to defend Bakhmut as tenaciously as it has, we must assess its true strategic value.
Bakhmut, despite the comments of the mainstream media, has considerable strategic value—at least, if your goal is to secure the Donbass rather than to defeat the Ukrainian army. Through it run the Kharkiv-Rostov and Donetsk-Kyiv highways, roads that would allow Russia to access Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, the latter being the site of the first Russian separatist victory—and, thus, symbolically important to Putin. Of course, Bakhmut is no longer as important as it was earlier in the war when taking it might have allowed Russian forces to encircle the Ukrainian defenders along the Sievierodonetsk-Lysychansk salient, in combination with a push from the Lyman direction. However, the access to the road network remains valuable even if encirclement is no longer a possibility. Just as importantly, major roads flow into Bahkmut, making it easier to supply Russian forces there. If what Russia is after is a breakthrough somewhere along the front, then it makes sense to try to break through where supplying your troops is easiest. In some respects, this parallels the German strategy regarding Verdun, where that location was chosen because of how the rail network made it easier for Germany to supply (though France had emotional reasons for defunding Verdun that Ukraine does not have for Bahkmut).
The media is either lying when it says the city has no strategic value or is incredibly ignorant. It definitely has strategic value: Especially because it is not clear what other target Russia should prefer to it. Yes, it would be better to have Kyiv, Lviv, or Odessa, but none of those are attackable. What target would the media suggest Russia attack instead? Perhaps the media would suggest that Russia should simply improve its defenses and do nothing. The hardliners, however, would never allow that. Putin would be facing accusations of cowardice if Russia were simply to stop pursuing any military objectives whatsoever.
That said, while the media’s remarks are an exaggeration at best, the basic insight that possession of Bakhmut will win the war for neither side is completely true—as is the idea that Russia is losing far too many soldiers, even if many are convicts, and far too much equipment in their attempt to occupy it. Though even here, one complicating factor is that the Kremlin probably saves money and reduces public backlash with every convict killed since the Kremlin doesn’t have to deal with any of the difficulties associated with reintegrating them. The Russians should continue to try to take it, but they should also be changing their tactics and strategy in order to take it at a lower cost.
While I acknowledge that Bakhmut has strategic value, I will argue there are actually quite a few political advantages associated with letting it fall---and while the city will help Russian logistics reach Kramitorsk and Slovyansk, it will only help; it will not guarantee the fall of these cities. Ukraine might want to let it fall on purpose in order to set up an internal conflict within the Russian armed forces that could ultimately help Ukraine win the war. At the very least, Ukraine should consider this upside when determining how many resources to invest in Bakhmut’s defense.
Bakhmut is Prigozhin's pet project---the Wagner Group's attempt to prove that it can do what the regular military cannot. And Prigozhin is a vocal critic of the regular Russian Army who believes he can run the war better than they can and wants resources transferred to the Wagner Group even if it comes at the expense of the Russian Army. So, the decision about whether to defend Bakhmut is really a strategic decision about which military force is better, the Russian Army under Surovikin or Wagner under Prighozhin. Unless the strategic value of Bakhmut is greater than the difference in fighting ability of these two forces and the value setting up a damaging rivalry between these groups, your decision to defend Bakhmut should really depend on how you want this power struggle between Wagner and the Russian Army to play out. It should be clear that Surovkin is the superior leader and military mind, so Ukraine should—ironically enough—actually want Prighozin to win. After all, do any of us believe Prighozin would have had the sense to abandon Kherson: No, he would have stayed there, allowing Ukraine to attrit Russian forces through the whole winter, reinforcing failure again and again without ever reconsidering his strategy, just as he is doing in Bakhmut.
It is unlikely Ukraine’s generals will be able to assess the situation in Bakhmut through this political lens: The fog of war can hide political considerations despite the manifest truth of Clausewitz’s maxim that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” However, should Ukraine lose Bakhmut, perhaps because it wishes to free up those resources to carry out its own offensive, there will be a silver lining attached. Bakhmut is not without strategic value; however, losing it might have even greater advantages given the unusual dynamics at play among Russia’s leadership. It will set up a battle within the Kremlin itself between Prighozin and Surovkin that only Ukraine can win. If I were Ukraine, I would devote fewer resources to the city’s defense and allow Russia to take it, at a high cost, though I fully acknowledge such a strategy entails risk.
An interesting article: https://www.newsweek.com/russia-troops-battle-bakhmut-battalions-isw-1769895