Executive Pay
The concern with inequality---esp. from those who claim to care about "society"---betrays an egregious ignorance of economics: For it is precisely inequality, inequality specifically with respect to opportunity costs and wants, that is the basis of all trade and social interaction. Men are social precisely because they are unequal. To decry inequality is to destroy the economic foundation of society.
But the overwhelming majority of mankind are not governed by intellect---not when their actions don't immediately affect them, at least: not when the costs are born by others. In the everyman's political discussions, things are said to convey qualities and characteristics of the speaker or to vent emotions in act of displacement: They are rarely said so as to describe the world. And so, we see people decrying executive compensation---knowing next to nothing about the consequences of reducing it or the causes of its growth over the years: Indeed, they are completely unaware that many of the "liberal" policies they themselves proscribe are responsible for the increase they find so offensive (This is a theme that characterizes the modern left's take on immigration. The let poor people into this country and then decry the fact that there are poor people in our country---thinking that a man's poverty can be cured in a matter of hours, and not years, I suppose).
The envy of executive compensation is a topic that deserves an essay---or perhaps a book---of its own. This essay serves a different purpose---to prove that the left's own policies are responsible for the size of executive compensation and that the consequences of reducing it would be disastrous.
There is no doubt that executive compensation has grown over and above the rate of inflation. However, the leftist hypothesis that this is merely the outgrowth of shareholders increased goodwill towards executives seems more than a little far-fetched. (Some leftists might claim that boards do not represent shareholders any longer; to the extent this is true, however, it is the result of laws requiring that "shareholders" serve on boards instead of shareholders.) It is, in fact, an efficient response to companies' increased market share and reduced competition, competition reduced by the simple fact that there are gigantic economies of scale with respect to regulatory compliance. A large company can afford to maintain records that comply with Sarbanes Oxley much better than a medium size company can. A large company can more readily weather the vagaries of the legal process, having a larger base of capital on which to borrow when the inevitable legal harassments come. These and other government policies have caused the average size of a firm, and its average market share, to increase. This, in turn, increases the value of a marginally more capable CEO: which, in turn, increases executive pay.
The results of reducing executive pay---esp. when the government policies that caused it to increase are still in place---would be the inefficient allocation of executive talent---inefficiencies that would eventually harm the performance of American companies. Instead of having the best CEO's go to the best and most productive companies, executive talent would be allocated almost at random. Of course, the exact costs of these policies are hard to quantify, but that there would be costs to the American economy and, thus, to the American people is certain.